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Abstract   A number of approaches to solving the well-known transfer pricing 
problem are known. However, few models satisfactorily resolve the core problem 
of allowing both the source and receiving divisions to earn a profit on transfers 
during a period in such a way that sub-optimal output levels are avoided. In 1969, 
Samuel proposed to use a transfer price schedule instead of just a single transfer 
price. An essential improvement of Samuels‟ model was given by Tomkins 
(1990) in his pragmatic-analytical transfer pricing approach, which is a 
combination of a single cost-plus transfer price and the pragmatic process of 
negotiation. This fundamental approach was developed under the assumption that 
the net average revenue curve for the final product is linear.  
 
In this paper, Tomkins‟ pragmatic-analytical model is further developed for non-
linear net average revenue curves. In particular, typical quadratic functions are 
considered and corresponding transfer price schedules are determined. A similar 
technique can be used for the transfer pricing problem with any net average 
revenue curve.  
 
Keywords: Transfer pricing; Tomkins‟ pragmatic-analytical model; Samuels‟ 
model; quadratic function; exponential function 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Dramatic changes within the business environment in past decades, including 
decentralisation and globalisation of business, have increased the importance of 
transfer pricing. Decentralisation implies that a central management cannot monitor 
and control all the operation parameters of each division and, therefore, it cannot 
calculate the optimal transfer prices taking into account that each division is usually 
an autonomous unit. Also, divisional managers have private information, which they 
may wish to conceal.  
 
However, the transfer pricing mechanism applied by an organisation can have a 
critical impact on its performance. This mechanism should motivate divisional 
managers to make optimal economic decisions without undermining divisional 
autonomy, and provide a reasonable measure for evaluating the managerial and 
economic performance of the source and receiving divisions, while being acceptable 
for taxation purposes. 
 
A number of approaches to resolving the transfer pricing conflicts are known. For 
example, goods can be transferred between the divisions at a variable cost with profit 
to the supplier provided by a periodic charge. However, this two-part transfer price 
system has a serious disadvantage because “the source division has no incentive to 
seek the optimal production level as it earns no profit on transactions made during the 
period” (Tomkins, 1990, p. 202). Another approach is based on sharing the group 
profit earned on the transferred goods, but its shortcomings include problems with the 
book-keeping and the economic meaning of the profit. Also, a more advanced dual-
rate transfer pricing system has been proposed. The problems with this approach 
concern the artificial nature of dual-rate transfer prices, which can lead to confusion. 
As a result, they are not widely used in practice. Many decentralized organizations 
use simple negotiation or negotiated optimal two-part tariffs to determine transfer 
prices. Although the efficiency of the latter is significantly higher than the efficiency 
of simple direct negotiation (Lantz, 2009), the problem with this approach is that the 
outcome may depend on the managers‟ negotiation skills and their unequal bargaining 
power. Recently, an interesting descriptive unconstrained model for transfer pricing in 
multinational supply chains has been proposed, which takes into account many factors 
(Villegas and Ouenniche, 2008). However, the authors have not provided any specific 
solution procedure to the model as “such a procedure would require specific 
assumptions about the cost and the revenue functions taken into account in the paper” 
(Villegas and Ouenniche, 2008, p. 846). Transfer pricing has been also studied by 
Gjerdrum et al. (2002), Lakhal (2006), Lakhal et al. (2005), Li (1997), Pfeiffer (1999), 
and Vidal and Goetschalckx (2001). 
 
Thus, the well-known transfer pricing problem has been studied over a long period of 
time. However, few models satisfactorily resolve the core problem of allowing both 
the source and receiving divisions to earn a profit on transfers during a period in such 
a way that sub-optimal output levels are avoided. Also, there is no explanation why 
“the theoretical recommendations differ from the practice of transfer pricing, with the 
possible exception of Tomkins‟ (1991) pragmatic-analytical perspective” (McAulay 
and Tomkins, 1992, p. 116).  
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In 1969, Samuel proposed the use of a transfer price schedule instead of simply a 
single transfer price. Tomkins (1990, p. 203) criticises this as follows:  
The trouble with Samuels‟ proposal is that one needs to know the optimal level of 
production and the amount to be transferred before one can see what point the 
pricing schedule needs to pass through… Also, while Samuels devised this basic 
concept some time ago, there is no evidence of its wide adoption in industry. One 
can only assume that it is seen by companies as too complex.  
An essential improvement of Samuels‟ model was given by Tomkins (1990) in his 
pragmatic-analytical transfer pricing approach, which is a combination of a single 
cost-plus transfer price and the pragmatic process of negotiation. In an attempt to 
understand why practitioners use full costing he has proved that full costing can 
provide optimum results, where full-cost transfer prices are used over the majority of 
output transferred and are negotiated over a small proportion of transfers.  
 
Tomkins‟ fundamental approach was developed under the assumption that the net 
average revenue curve for the final product is linear. However, in practice this is not 
the case:  
The demand curve is normally drawn in textbooks as a straight line suggesting a 
linear relationship between price and demand but in reality, the demand curve will 
be non-linear! No business has a perfect idea of what the demand curve for a 
particular product looks like, they use real-time evidence from markets to estimate 
the demand conditions and their accumulated experience of market conditions 
gives them an advantage in constructing demand-price relationships. (Riley, 2006, 
p. 25) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Samuels‟ transfer pricing policy. 
 
Tomkins (1990) discussed a non-linear net average revenue curve and considered a 
convex quadratic curve as a natural generalisation of a linear function. However, no 
solution for quadratic functions was given. In our view, a convex quadratic curve is 
indeed the most typical non-linear net average revenue curve, but it is unclear what is 
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a shape of a typical concave net average revenue curve, which was also mentioned by 
Tomkins (1990). In this paper, we will consider convex quadratic functions and an 
example of a concave function, and determine the corresponding transfer price 
schedules. Moreover, in Section 5 we explain how a similar technique can be used to 
solve the transfer pricing problem with any specified net average revenue curve.  
 
2. TOMKINS’ PRAGMATIC-ANALYTICAL MODEL 
 
We assume that Division A, a source division, produces goods and transfers them to 
Division B, i.e. there is no intermediate good market, and Division B, after further 
processing, sells the goods to an external market. It is also assumed that Division A is 
a profit centre as it produces other goods that are not transferred to Division B, and 
for those goods there is an intermediate external market. Let q be the optimal level of 
output to be produced by A and transferred to B, VCA stand for A‟s variable cost, and 
NMRB denote B‟s net marginal revenue. 
 
Suppose that one wants both Division A and Division B to earn a profit on transfers in 
order to motivate them to optimally produce and transfer goods. To solve the 
problem, Samuels (1969) proposes a transfer price schedule as indicated in Figure 1. 
It is well known that this schedule encourages both A and B to use the optimal level q, 
which maximises overall profits.  
 
Tomkins (1990) points out a number of disadvantages of Samuels‟ model. The most 
serious trouble is that “one needs to know the optimal level of production and the 
amount to be transferred before one can see what point the pricing schedule needs to 
pass through” (Tomkins, 1990, p. 203). Another problem is that this model has not 
been widely adopted in industry – perhaps it is too complex to use, and therefore a 
simpler approach is needed.  
 
An improvement of Samuels‟ model was given by Tomkins (1990) in his pragmatic-
analytical transfer pricing approach, which is a combination of a single transfer price 
and the pragmatic process of negotiation as illustrated in Figure 2. The basic idea is 
that a company fixes a transfer price t by a cost-plus method provided that the transfer 
price is limited to an output level f such that the following condition is satisfied 
(Tomkins, 1990, p. 207): 
 
Constraint 1 
The transfer price line projected horizontally to the right must not cut through B‟s 
net marginal revenue schedule if sub-optimal output levels are to be avoided. 
 
The transfer price t must be fixed in such a way that A‟s fixed costs are covered and, 
moreover, a „reasonable‟ profit is provided to A, see Figure 2. The area of negotiation 
(between f and q) is where the transfer price t is no longer applicable, i.e. A and B 
should negotiate further transfers. The scale of negotiation must satisfy the following 
condition  (Tomkins, 1990, p. 207): 
 
Constraint 2 
The cost-plus transfer price (t) must be applicable to a sizeable proportion of the 
optimal amount of output (f) to be transferred in order to limit the scale of 
negotiation needed. 
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Thus, the objective is to maximise the proportion of optimal output, denoted by x, for 
which the cost-plus transfer price can be applied, subject to Constraint 1 and the 
condition that A‟s fixed costs are covered and A‟s profit is provided. Let c stand for 
source division‟s target contribution as a proportion of maximum group contribution.  
 
Tomkins (1990) assumed the following: 
 
 Division A transfers goods to Division B, i.e. there is no intermediate good 
market. 
 All of A‟s and B‟s costs are fixed. 
 The net average revenue curve for the final product (NARB) is linear. 
Note that the second assumption is not realistic and it was only made for simplicity of 
calculations. However, Tomkins (1990) gave no adjustment of the optimal transfer 
price schedule when this assumption does not hold, i.e. variable costs are not equal to 
zero. We will make the same assumptions and then show how to adjust the optimal 
schedule to take into account variable costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Tomkins‟ pragmatic-analytical transfer pricing approach.  
 
 
Under these assumptions, Tomkins (1990) proved an interesting result that, for a 
given c, the value of x can be found by solving the following quadratic equation:  
 
.0)1(2  cxx  
 
In fact, x is the upper root of the above equation, i.e.  
 
cx 5.025.05.0  . 
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Note that such a root exists only if 0c0.5. Now, the corresponding transfer price 
can be calculated as follows: 
 
),1(2 xpt   
 
where p is the net average revenue corresponding to the output q. Tomkins (1990) 
summarises his result in Table 1: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. The likely practical relevance of the pragmatic-analytical approach. 
 
For example, if A‟s target contribution is set at 18% of the total maximum group 
contribution, then the corresponding cost-plus transfer price can be applied to 90% of 
the optimal output to recover its target contribution. As can be seen in Table 1, the 
proportion of group contribution over which negotiation is required is only 1%, so the 
negotiation makes practically no difference. In contrast, if A‟s target contribution is 
close to 50% of the total maximum group contribution, then the proportion of group 
contribution over which negotiation is required becomes substantial. For instance, if c 
is equal to 50%, then negotiation is required over 25% of the group contribution.  
 
For convenience, let us summarize the notation introduced in this section:  
 
 
Table 2. The basic parameters. 
Source division's target 
contribution as a 
proportion of maximum 
group contribution         
(c)  
Maximum proportion of 
optimal output for which 
the cost-plus transfer 
price can be applied      
(x) 
Proportion of group 
contribution over 
which negotiation 
required                 
(n) 
0.50 0.50 0.250 
0.48 0.60 0.160 
0.46 0.64 0.129 
0.42 0.70 0.090 
0.38 0.74 0.065 
0.32 0.80 0.040 
0.26 0.85 0.024 
0.18 0.90 0.010 
0.09 0.95 0.002 
0.00 1.00 0.000 
q 
VCA 
NMRB 
p 
pq 
c 
t 
f 
x 
 
n 
The optimal level of output to be produced by Division A and transferred to B. 
Division A‟s variable cost. 
Division B‟s net marginal revenue. 
B‟s net average revenue corresponding to the output q. 
The maximum contribution, which the entire group can earn. 
A‟s target contribution as a proportion of maximum group contribution. 
The transfer price. 
B‟s chosen output level corresponding to the transfer price t. 
Maximum proportion of optimal output for which the cost-plus transfer price 
can be applied. 
Proportion of group contribution over which negotiation required. 
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3. QUADRATIC NARB CURVE 
 
In this section, we assume that there is no intermediate good market, all A‟s and B‟s 
costs are fixed, but that B‟s NAR curve for the final product is quadratic and convex 
from above, i.e. 
 
NARB
2)( bfaf  , 
 
where a,b>0. The total revenue, denoted by TR, is  
 
TR ,)( 3bfaff   
 
and therefore the NMRB schedule is  
 
NMRB(f) .3
TR 2bfa
f



  
 
  £ 
 
 
    
  1.5p = a 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
p 
 
 
t   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. An illustration of a quadratic NARB curve. 
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We remind that x = f/q denotes the proportion of optimal output for which the transfer 
price t is applied. For a given proportion c, there are multiple txf rectangles with an 
area equal to c, i.e. tf = c(pq). Therefore, 
 
.
/ x
cp
qf
cp
f
cpq
t   
 
Thus, the top right corners of such txf rectangles are specified by the hyperbola RS 
(see Figure 3) with the following equation: 
 
,
x
cp
t   
 
where c and p are fixed numbers, and t and x are variable. To promote efficiency an 
aim is to maximise x, so we need to find the coordinates of the point S. In order to 
find them, we need to equate cp/x to 23bfa  : 
  
23bfa
x
cp
 . 
 
Substituting xq for f, we obtain  
 
3bq
2
x
3
 – ax + cp = 0.                                                (1) 
 
By definition, p = a – bq2, and, by rearranging, we have 
  
bq
2 
= a – p. 
 
The NMRB schedule gives 0 = a – 3bq
2
. Hence 0 = a – 3(a – p)  or   
 
a = 1.5p.                                                           (2) 
 
Therefore,  
 
bq
2
 = a – p = 0.5p.                                                   (3) 
 
Thus, equation (1) can be rewritten as follows:  
 
1.5px
3
 – 1.5px + cp = 0 
 
or  
3x 0
3
2
 cx .                                                 (4) 
 
We need to find the upper root out of two roots between 0 and 1. The function f (x) = 
x
3
 – x + 2c/3 has its minimum between 0 and 1 at the point .3/1x  Hence, the two 
roots between 0 and 1 only exist if  
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    03/23/13/1 5.05.1  c  
or  
c < 3/1  0.577. 
 
In what follows, we assume that c < 3/1 . Now we apply a standard technique to 
solve equation (4). The discriminant of the above cubic equation (2) is D = Q
3
 + R
2
, 
where Q = 
3
1
 and R =
3
c
 . Therefore,  
D = 






3
1
9
1 2c . 
 
Since c < 3/1 , the discriminant D is less than 0, and hence all three roots are real 
and unequal.  
 
If we put 
 = arccos  3arccos
3
c
Q
R










, 
then the real roots are:  
cos
3
2
3
cos21 







Qx 





3

, 





 

3
2
cos22

Qx , 





 

3
4
cos23

Qx . 
 
It is easy to check that x2 is a negative root and 30 x 11  x , i.e. x1 is the required 
root.  
 
Let n denote the proportion of group contribution over which negotiation is required. 
Taking into account (2) and (3), it is not difficult to see that 
 
       
q
f
dfbfanpq 23  
  
q
xq
bfaf 3  
   222 qbxaxqbqaq   
 pxpxqqp 5.05.1 2  
 35.05.11 xxqp  . 
Therefore,  
35.05.11 xxn  . 
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Some combinations of the parameters c, x and n are summarised in Table 3.  
 
 
 
Table 3. The practical relevance of the quadratic model. 
 
 
3.1. Transfer Price Schedule 
 
For a given c, the first step is to calculate x, the proportion of optimal output for 
which the transfer price t is applied: 
 
  





 3arccos
3
1
cos
3
2
cx .                                      (5) 
 
The transfer price t can be found using this formula:  
x
cp
t  .                                                          (6) 
The formulae (5) and (6) provide the necessary transfer price schedule. Divisions A 
and B should negotiate further transfers over the following proportion of group 
contribution: 
  
35.05.11 xx  . 
 
3.2. Transfer Price Schedule with Non-Zero VCA and an Example 
 
If A‟s variable cost is a non-zero constant, then the precise meaning of c becomes 
slightly different: it is A‟s target contribution less A‟s total variable costs as a 
proportion of maximum group contribution less A‟s total variable costs. Now let creal 
denote A‟s target contribution as a proportion of maximum group contribution. We 
have 
Source division's target 
contribution as a 
proportion of maximum 
group contribution        
(c ) 
Maximum proportion of 
optimal output for which 
the cost-plus transfer price 
can be applied                  
(x )
Proportion of group 
contribution over 
which negotiation 
required                 
(n )
0.57 0.630 0.180
0.55 0.677 0.140
0.50 0.742 0.091
0.45 0.786 0.064
0.40 0.822 0.045
0.35 0.852 0.031
0.30 0.879 0.021
0.25 0.903 0.014
0.20 0.925 0.008
0.15 0.946 0.004
0.10 0.965 0.002
0.05 0.983 0.000
0.00 1.000 0.000
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creal qp = cq(p – VCA) + qVCA. 
 
Therefore, 
 
A
Areal
VC
VC



p
pc
c .                                                (7) 
 
Next, the proportion of optimal output x, for which the transfer price t is applied, can 
be calculated by formula (5) or taken from Table 3. The transfer price t can be found 
using the following formula:  
A
A VC
)VC(



x
pc
t .                                         (8) 
 
The formula for the proportion of group contribution over which negotiation is 
required is as follows: 
 
n(1 – VCA/p). 
 
For example, suppose that A‟s target contribution is 40%, i.e. creal is set at 0.4, and let 
p=£100 and VCA=£20. Then formula (7) yields c=0.25. From Table 3 or by formula 
(5), we obtain x=0.903. Thus, using (8), we have t = £42.15. The negotiation is 
required over 1.4(1–0.2) = 1.1%. 
 
Note that the above formulae can be easily implemented in Excel. For example, 
assuming that c is kept in cell A1, formula (5) can be written in Excel as follows: 
 
=(2/SQRT(3))*COS(ACOS(-A1*SQRT(3))/3) 
 
4. EXPONENTIAL NARB CURVE  
 
Although in reality the NAR curve is rather convex and quadratic, we would like to 
consider an example illustrating that the above technique also works for non-quadratic 
non-convex NAR curves.  
 
Let us make the same assumptions, except that the NAR curve for the final product is 
now exponential and concave from above:  
 
NARB   bfaef / , 
 
where a>0 and b>0. It follows that the total revenue is  
 
TR   bffaef / . 
Therefore,  
NMRB    ./1
TR / bfae
f
f bf 


   
Since NMRB(q)=0, we obtain 0/1  bq , i.e.  b = q. Also, NARB(q) = p. Hence  
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pae qq  / , i.e. 
 
 a=ep. 
Thus,  
NARB   qfpef /1  
and  
NMRB    qfpef qf /1/1   . 
 
  £ 
 
a
 
 
Figure 4. An illustration of an exponential NARB curve. 
 
 
Similar to Section 3, we need to find the coordinates of the point S. We have 
 
 xpe
x
cp x   11  
or 
  cexx x  11 .                                                    (9) 
 
The proportion of group contribution over which negotiation is required can be found 
as follows: 
 dfqfepnpq qf
q
xq
/1/1    
 
q
xq
qffpe /1  
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 .1 1 xxeqp   
Therefore,  
xxen  11 .                                                      (10) 
 
For convenience, a number of combinations of the parameters c, x and n are shown in 
Table 4: 
 
Source division's target 
contribution as a 
proportion of maximum 
group contribution          
(c)  
Maximum proportion of 
optimal output for which 
the cost-plus transfer price 
can be applied                     
(x) 
Proportion of group 
contribution over 
which negotiation 
required                    
(n) 
0.43 0.446 0.224 
0.42 0.480 0.193 
0.40 0.527 0.154 
0.38 0.565 0.127 
0.36 0.597 0.107 
0.34 0.626 0.090 
0.32 0.654 0.076 
0.30 0.680 0.064 
0.28 0.704 0.053 
0.26 0.728 0.044 
0.24 0.751 0.037 
0.22 0.773 0.030 
0.20 0.795 0.024 
0.18 0.817 0.019 
0.16 0.838 0.015 
0.14 0.858 0.011 
0.12 0.879 0.008 
0.10 0.899 0.005 
0.08 0.920 0.003 
0.06 0.940 0.002 
0.04 0.960 0.001 
0.02 0.980 0.000 
0.00 1.000 0.000 
 
Table 4. The practical relevance of the exponential model. 
 
4.1. Transfer Price Schedule 
 
Thus, for a given A‟s target contribution c, the corresponding maximum proportion x 
of the optimal output, for which the transfer price t can be applied, is found from 
Table 4 or by solving equation (9). Then, the transfer price t can be found using this 
formula: 
x
cp
t  . 
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Divisions A and B should negotiate further transfers over the proportion of group 
contribution, which can be found by formula (10). Similar to Section 3.2, the above 
formulae can easily be adapted for the case when VCA is not equal to zero. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper, Tomkins‟ pragmatic-analytical model was further developed for non-
linear net average revenue curves. In our view, the most typical non-linear net average 
revenue curves are convex quadratic functions. These have been considered and 
corresponding transfer price schedules have been determined. We have also 
considered an exponential NAR curve to illustrate that the above technique works for 
non-quadratic non-convex curves. Note that both the quadratic and exponential NAR 
curves depend on two coefficients a and b, but the corresponding transfer price 
schedules described in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 4.1 are not dependent on those 
coefficients. This implies that in practice we only need to decide whether the NAR 
curve is quadratic (exponential), and there is no need to determine the coefficients a, b 
and the exact formula for such a function. 
 
A similar technique can be used for any NAR curve. Indeed, if we know k+1 points of 
the curve, then it can be approximated by the interpolation polynomial in the 
Lagrange form of degree k. Therefore, we can find the NMRB schedule and then, 
using the above hyperbola RS, construct a polynomial of degree k+1 of the variable x. 
For k=2, such a polynomial is similar to the left-hand side of equation (1). We remind 
that the aim is to find the largest root of this polynomial, which does not exceed 1. Of 
course, for k=2, the cubic polynomial equation (1) can be simplified to (4) and then 
solved analytically as shown in Section 3. However, in general we cannot find this 
root analytically, so it must be determined computationally using one of the known 
methods.  
 
Thus, the fundamental approach of Tomkins can be applied to the transfer pricing 
problem with any net average revenue curve. 
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